Appelman Law Firm Fights Minnesota DWI Forfeiture laws!

CALL 1-800-DIAL-DWI NOW TO DISCUSS YOUR MINNESOTA DUI DWI DRUNK DRIVING CASE OR

Minnesota DWI Vehicle Forfeiture Laws and Statutes

Minn.Stat. § 169A.63 Vehicle Forfeitures, states in part:

Subdivision 1. Definitions. (e) “Designated Offense” includes:

(1) a violation of section 169A.20 under the circumstances described in section 169A.24 (first-degree driving while impaired), or 169A.25 (second degree driving while impaired); or

(2) a violation of section 169A.20 or an ordinance in conformity with it:

(i) by a person whose driver’s license has been canceled as inimical to public safety under section 171.04, subd. 1, clause (10), and not reinstated; or

(ii) by a person who is subject to a restriction on the person’s driver’s license under section 171.09 (commissioner’s license restrictions), which provides that the person may not use or consume any amount of alcohol or a controlled substance.

***

Subdivision 3. Right to possession vests immediately; custody. All right, title, and interest in a vehicle subject to forfeiture under this section vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the conduct resulting in the designated offense or designated license revocation giving rise to the forfeiture. Any vehicle seized under this section is not subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the appropriate agency subject to the orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings.

***

Subdivision 6. Vehicle subject to forfeiture. A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this section if it was used in the commission of a designated offense or was used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation.

***

Subdivision 8. Administrative forfeiture procedure. (a) A motor vehicle used to commit a designated offense or used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation is subject to administrative forfeiture under this subdivision.

***

Subdivision 10. Disposition of a forfeited vehicle. (a) if the vehicle is administratively forfeited under subdivision 8, or if the court finds under subdivision 9 that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture under subdivisions 6 and 7, the appropriate agency shall:

(1) sell the vehicle and distribute the proceeds under paragraph (b); or

(2) keep the vehicle for official use. If the agency keeps a forfeited vehicle for official use, it shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the motor vehicle is available for use by the agency’s officers who participate in the drug abuse resistance education program.

[It should be noted that section 169A.63 is pending legislation.]

Through the enactment of these laws, the state legislature has authorized motor vehicle or recreational vehicle forfeitures when the vehicle has been used in the commission of a first (§169A.24) or second degree DWI (§169A.25), when a driver is issued a DWI and his or her license has been revoked or canceled as “inimical to public safety,” or a DWI offense is committed by a person whose license has been limited by the Commissioner of Public Safety to require that the person abstain from the use of alcohol or drugs. “The legislature intended vehicle forfeiture…to serve the important, nonpunitive, remedial goal of enhancing public safety by removing from repeat intoxicated drivers the instrumentality to commit their violations.” Hawes v. 1997 Jeep Wrangler, 602 N.W.2d 874 (Minn.App. 1999).

Furthermore, a Motorist's prior adjudication of accelerated rehabilitative disposition (ARD) in another state does constitute a driving while under the influence (DWI) conviction in state, for purposes of calculating previous DWI convictions under forfeiture statute where the ARDis consonant with Minnesota DWI laws. City of Golden Valley v. One 1998 Pontiac Grand Prix, VIN No. 1G2WP521WF309530, 616 N.W.2d 780 (Minn.App. 2000). In other words, as proscribed by statute, convictions for DWI in other states constitute prior DWI convictions in the state of Minnesota for the purposes of application of the Minnesota DWI forfeiture statute.

The Minnesota Forfeiture Laws Report from the Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department (as amended in August 2000), states that a vehicle may be forfeited under these statutes “only if the driver is convicted of the designated offense…, fails to appear in court on the impaired driving charge, or the driver’s conduct results in a license revocation.” The report also states that in order for the revocation to occur, the owner of the vehicle must be the violator unless “the owner knew or should have known of the unlawful use of or intended use” of the vehicle. The forfeiture is perfected upon criminal conviction for the violation of § 169A.20 accompanied by proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the aggravating factors (prior convictions, BAC greater than .20, child endangerment, § 171.04 cancellation, or § 171.09 restriction). Johnson, Sandra H., Vehicle Forfeiture, Bloomington City Attorney’s Office.

Along with being convicted of a designated offense, a vehicle is also presumed to be subject to forfeiture if the driver fails to appear for a scheduled court appearance with respect to the designated offense charged and fails to voluntarily surrender within 48 hours after the time required for appearance; or the driver’s conduct results in a designated license revocation and the deriver fails to seek judicial review of the revocation in a timely manner as required by section 169A.53, subd. 2. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(1)-(3) (2000).

The forfeiture of the vehicle may be affected through judicial action or through administrative proceedings. If the vehicle is subject to an administrative forfeiture proceeding, the appropriate agency must serve the driver or operator of the vehicle with notice of the seizure and intent to forfeit the vehicle immediately or within a reasonable time after the seizure of the vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b) (2000). If the offender is not convicted in court of the offense, the license revocation is rescinded, or the vehicle owner is found not to have been privy to the offense, then the vehicle must be returned to the owner immediately.

If the offender is not convicted as a result of the charges that subject the vehicle to forfeiture, the state or city and not the offender is responsible for paying storage fees. Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, VIN No. 2MEBP95F9CX644211, License No. MN 225 NSG, 622 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2001). If the owner of the vehicle is convicted of the triggering offense and the vehicle is forfeited, then the payment of storage fees is made from the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle. Otherwise the state is responsible for all storage fees after the initial seizure of the vehicle unless the vehicle. Id at 119. In Genin, the Minnesota Supreme court reasoned that because after the initial seizure of the vehicle, “all right, title, and interest in a vehicle subject to forfeiture…vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the conduct resulting in the designated offense…giving rise to the forfeiture,” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 3 (2000), the statute makes the agency responsible for the vehicle during its seizure. Genin at 119.

If the owner of a vehicle wishes to regain possession of the vehicle before the determination of the forfeiture action, the owner may do so by posting a bond or security equal to the retail value of the seized vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 4 (2000). The seizing agency has discretion whether to return the vehicle subject to the forfeiture action. Id. If the agency decides to approve the security or bond, “the seized vehicle may be returned to the owner only if a disabling device is attached to the vehicle.” Id. Once the vehicle has been returned, the forfeiture action then must proceed against the bond or security as if it were the seized vehicle. Id.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has deemed vehicle forfeitures as mandatory, not discretionary, where motor vehicles are subject to the DWI forfeiture statute. Adkins v. 1979 Midas R.V., 546 N.W.2d 768 (Minn.App.1996). However, this ruling came down prior to the revisions made to the DWI laws when chapter 169A was enacted during the 2000 legislative session, taking effect on January 1, 2001. The repealed forfeiture statute, Minn.Stat. § 169.1217, provided that the court “shall order the appropriate agency to: (1) sell the vehicle and distribute the proceeds…or (2) keep the vehicle for official use...” Minn.Stat. § 169.1217, subd. 9(a)(1)-(2) (repealed 2000). The new statute provides the same language and is laid out in Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 10(a)(1)-(2). The court’s interpretation of the previous statute holding that vehicle forfeitures are mandatory if the statutorily proscribed conditions are met leads to the logical conclusion that the legislative intent behind the statute was to ensure that vehicle forfeitures are mandatory. If the legislature had a different intent, after the ruling in Adkins they more than likely would have changed the wording of the statute when repealing the previous DWI chapter and enacting chapter 169A.

The forfeiture of the motor vehicle itself are “civil in rem actions against the instrumentality of a legislatively defined category of serious [DWI] offenses”, and does not occur as a result of criminal sanctions. This stipulation allows the statute to avoid any contradictions with the double jeopardy clause. However, because the resulting seizure is punitive in nature, it brings the statute within the purview of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that vehicle forfeitures are not so grossly disproportionate as to be excessively punitive, and therefore do not violate the excessive fines clause. Hawes v. 1997 Jeep Wrangler, 602 N.W.2d 874 (Minn.App.1999). In making the determination whether forfeiture of a motor vehicle is excessive, the court examines: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) a comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for the commission of other crimes in the same jurisdiction, and (3) a comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek, # GHS-186 VIN: 3G7DA03E41S500032, 655 N.W.2d 12 (Minn.App. 2002) (review granted, affirmed 669 N.W.2d 893).

The Hawes holding also supports the legal principle that the vehicle forfeiture statutes do not violate the Double Jeopardy prohibitions of the state or federal constitutions. Hawes v. 1997 Jeep Wrangler, 602 N.W.2d 874 (Minn.App.1999). “The statute serves a valid, nonpunitive, remedial objective distinct from any monetary compensation or redress the state may receive from sale of the seized vehicle.” Id. Several other cases have affirmed this position by the Court of Appeals in holding that forfeitures of vehicles owned by driving while intoxicated offenders do not constitute “punishment,” and do not violate the double jeopardy clause even though the civil penalty does have punitive aspects. City of Pine Springs v. One 1992 Harley Davidson, 555 N.W.2d 749 (Minn.App.1996); City of New Brighton v. 2000 Ford Excursion, 622 N.W.2d 364 (Minn.App. 2001).

Several defenses exist to warrant the dismissal of any forfeiture proceedings. First, the Defendant City or County is required to serve notice of the vehicle forfeiture either immediately or within a reasonable time after the vehicle has been seized pursuant to § 169.63, subd. 2. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8(b). If the City or County fails to notify the vehicle owner of their intentions to forfeit the vehicle, the Plaintiff has the right to claim a due process violation but will prevail on the claim only with a showing that the violation resulted in prejudicing the Plaintiff. Johnson v. 1996 GMC Sierra, 606 N.W.2d 455 (Minn.App. 2000).

The second defense is the “innocent owner” defense. In Neumayer v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 2001 WL 856288 (Minn.App. 2001), the court found that owner means “registered owner,” which is not subject to rebuttal by proof of actual ownership. In Neumayer, the wife and registered owner of the vehicle in question had neither actual, nor constructive knowledge that her husband would be using the vehicle after the consumption of alcohol. Thus, the wife had a bona fide security interest in the vehicle while satisfying the remainder of the statutory conditions to provide that the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture.

Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(b) provides:

A vehicle encumbered by a bona fide security interest…is subject to the interest of the secured party…unless the party…had knowledge of or consented to the act upon which the forfeiture is based.

The courts have construed the meaning of “bona fide” as “made in good faith without fraud or deceit,” or “in or with good faith; honesty, openly, and sincerely…real, actual, genuine, and not feigned.” Stanton v. Mazda 2001 VIN 4F2YU08121KM57063, Plate No. GLE 228(MN),660 N.W.2d 137 (Minn.App. 2003) (quoting Rogers v. Ponti-Peterson Post No. 1720, 495 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn.App. 1993)).

In Stanton, the offender was arrested for her third DUI in 10 years. The offender was notified the vehicle was subject to forfeiture but her grandmother had cosigned the loan. By virtue of the grandmother’s co-signature, the grandmother had a bona fide security interest in the vehicle and furthermore had no knowledge of and did not consent to the offense on which the forfeiture was based. Stanton at 139. Thus, the State was not entitled to size the vehicle under the forfeiture statute even though the security interest was never perfected under Minn.Stat § 168A.17. The Court concluded that because of the wording of the forfeiture statute and the adding of the phrase “bona fide,” the legislature intended that something less than a perfected security interest would suffice to establish an interest in the vehicle removing it from the purview of § 169A.63. Id at 139, 140.

The only stipulation to the “innocent owner” defense is that the party with a legitimate security interest must file a petition for a judicial determination or review within the statutorily proscribed thirty (30) days. Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8 (2000). The thirty-day window is set out in Minn.Stat. § 169A.subd. 8(d). “If you do not demand judicial review exactly as prescribed in Minnesota Statutes, section 169A.63, subdivision 8, you lose the right to a judicial determination of this forfeiture and you lose any right you may have to the above described property.” Id. However, according to section (b) of 169A.63, subdivision 8, when a vehicle is seized or within a reasonable time after the seizure, the appropriate agency must serve the driver or operator of the vehicle with a notice of the seizure and intent to forfeit the vehicle. This includes the notification of “all persons known to have an ownership, possessory, or security interest in the vehicle…of the seizure and the intent to forfeit the vehicle.” Id. Sufficient notice may be made by certified mail to the address shown on the vehicle registration otherwise, notice may be given in the manner provided by law for service of a summons in a civil action. Id. Therefore, if an owner with a legitimate security interest in the vehicle has not received notice of the seizure and intent of the state to forfeit the vehicle, deference should be shown to the owner if the vehicle if the thirty day window has been missed.

In conclusion, vehicle forfeiture subsequent to conviction for a designated offense for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is statutorily proscribed and set forth in Minnesota Statute section 169A.63. The Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that vehicle forfeitures are mandatory, not discretionary as a result of a conviction for a designated offense. The vehicle forfeiture can be avoided through an acquittal, case dismissal, or defense. The most common defense to vehicle forfeiture is the “innocent owner” defense in which case there is an owner with a separate security interest in the vehicle and the owner had no knowledge of or gave no consent to the operation of the vehicle by the defendant under the influence of alcohol. And finally, the forfeiture of vehicles subject to conviction of a designated offense has been held constitutionally valid in that it violates neither the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment nor the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

CALL 1-800-DIAL-DWI NOW TO DISCUSS YOUR DUI DWI DRUNK DRIVING CASE OR

Visit the other Members of “America’s Top DUI & DWI Defense Attorneys™”:

Top Dallas Texas DWI Attorney Douglas Wilder

Top Oregon DUI Attorney Peter Carini

Top Minnesota DWI Attorney Avery Appelman

Top Detroit Michigan DUI DWI OUIL Attorney Patrick Barone

Top Illinois DUI Attorney Donald Ramsell

Top West Texas DWI Attorney Stephen Hamilton

Top West Palm Beach Florida DUI Attorney Jon Anastasio